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COSTS DEDUCTIBLE BY THE LESSEE IN ACCOUNTING TO
ROYALTY OWNERS FOR PRODUCTION OF OIL OR GAS
Introduction
Louisiana Mineral Code article 213 defines "royalty" as "any interest
in production, or its value, from or attributable to land subject to a
mineral lease, that is deliverable or payable to the lessor or others
entitled to share therein."' Neither the terms of article 213 nor the
accompanying comments shed any light on the question of which costs,
if any, are deductible by the lessee in determining the royalty due to
his lessor. However, the courts, in addressing the question, have applied
the law pertaining to the correlative concept of mineral royalty to
determine the proper calculation of royalties due under mineral leases.
2
Article 80 defines a mineral royalty in these terms:
A mineral royalty is the right to participate in production of
minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a
mineral servitude owned by another. Unless expressly qualified
by the parties, a royalty is a right to share in gross production
free of mining or drilling and production costs.'
The terms of this article indicate that in the absence of any express
provision to the contrary in the lease agreement, the royalty owner is
exempt from any liability for drilling and production costs.4 The com-
ments accompanying article 80 indicate that while the royalty is a right
to share in production free of any production costs, the parties to the
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. La. R.S. 31:213 (1975) [hereinafter cited as La. Min. Code]. Unless indicated
otherwise, all references to articles will be to the Louisiana Mineral Code.
2. Such treatment is in accordance with the terms of articles 17 and 21 of the
Louisiana Civil Code. Article 17 states: "Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject
matter, must be construed with a reference to each other; what is clear in one statute
may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another." Article 21 states: "In all
civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide
according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and
reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent."
3. La. Min. Code art. 80 (1975).
4. Id. (and see accompanying comments).
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lease are free to specify which of those costs, if any, are to be imposed
on the royalty owner's share of production.' The comments also note
that while article 80 does not define production costs, definitional prob-
lems may be resolved by "resort to industrial custom and jurisprudence
in Louisiana and other jurisdictions." '6
Article 122 specifies that a mineral lessee "is bound to perform the
contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased
as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and
his lessor."' The mineral lessee's general obligation to act as a rea-
sonably prudent operator includes, among other duties, the obligation
to "produce and market minerals discovered and capable of production
in paying quantities."'
The question of which costs are deductible from royalty often arises
as a result of costs incurred by the lessee in the course of fulfilling his
implied duty to market the product. This article will focus on the
deductibility of costs where the lease agreement does not express any
intent contrary to the general provisions of article 80, and it will review
and analyze the classification scheme presently employed by Louisiana
courts to determine which costs are deductible.
Common Variations of Royalty Clauses
The classification, of costs by the courts and the effect of that
classification on the amount of royalty to be paid by the lessee is a
function of the royalty clause. Although there are currently a great
variety of oil and gas lease forms in use, there are three basic types of
royalty clauses: (1) the proceeds clause, (2) the market value clause, and
(3) the market price clause. 9
Royalties paid under a "proceeds", "net proceeds", or "gross pro-
ceeds" clause are based on the amount actually received by the lessee
from the sale of the minerals.' 0 While the term "proceeds" does not
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. La. Min. Code art. 122 (1975) (and see accompanying comments). La. Civ Code
art. 2710. The requirement of article 122 that the lessee perform his obligation as "a
reasonably prudent operator" reflects the same objective standard expressed in Civil Code.
article 2710 which requires that a lessee enjoy the thing leased as "a good administrator."
8. See La. Min. Code art. 122, comment (1975).
9. Fischl, Ascertaining the Value oi Price of Gas for Purposes of the Royalty Clause,
21 Okla. L. Rev 22 (1968); Note, Oil and Gas-Obligations-The Meaning of "Market
Value" in a Gas Lease Royalty Clause, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1049 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Meaning of Market Value]; Comment, Value of Lessor's Share of Production Where
Gas Only is Produced, 25 Tex. L. Rev. 641 (1946-1949) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Value of Lessor's Share].
10. Note, Meaning of Market Value, supra note 9, at 1050.
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indicate anything as to the deductibility of costs in calculating the amount
of royalty due to the lessor, certain expenses have nevertheless tradi-
tionally been deducted from the gross proceeds of the sale." This is
true whether the royalty clause specified either "proceeds" or "net
proceeds," as neither term reflects an intention to expand the lessee's
implied duty to market the product. 2 However, where the term "gross
proceeds" is used, one may infer an intent to expand this duty. 3
Otherwise, the "proceeds" and "net proceeds" upon which the royalty
is based are generally determined by deducting certain costs of marketing
the product from the amount actually received by the lessee from the
sale of minerals.' 4
Problems of construction may arise where the royalty clause specifies
"proceeds," but fails to state whether the proceeds are to be determined
"at the well" or "at the place of sale." Absent any express provision
to the contrary, it is submitted that the determination should be made
"at the well," providing for the deduction of marketing costs from the
proceeds to arrive at the amount upon which the royalty would be
based." To construe the clause otherwise would be to contradict the
general current of authority defining "proceeds" and "net proceeds"
as synonymous, since such a construction would have the effect of
expanding the lessee's implied duty to market.
Clauses specifying the calculation of royalties based on "market
price" and "market value" are generally viewed by the courts as syn-
onymous.' 6 They are sometimes distinguished, however, on the basis
I I. Comment, Value of Lessor's Share, supra note 9, at 655. The soundness of the
principle is most apparent where the sale occurred other than at the mouth of the well,
because the lessee incurs additional expenses incidental to his implied duty to market the
product, such as transportation costs. See also Fischl, supra note 9, at 24..
12. "It is difficult to state accurately what expenses are deductible when the term
employed is either 'proceeds' alone or 'net proceeds'. It is submitted, however, that there
should be no difference in the computation under either term." Comment, Value of
Lessor's Share, supra note 9, at 655. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 730, 67 S. Ct. 87 (1946).
13. "Thus, where the term 'gross proceeds' is employed, it is believed only the direct
expenses of handling the gas necessary to put it into a salable condition should be
deducted." Comment, Value of Lessor's Share, supra note 9 at 655.
14. Fischl, supra note 9, at 24.
15. 3 H. Williams, Oil and Gas Law § 645.1 (1985). See also Matzen v. Hugoton
Prod. Co., 182 Kan. 456, 321 P.2d 576 (1958) (expenses related to gathering, processing
and marketing the gas were deductible from gross proceeds in determining royalty where
lessee was required to pay one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of gas and where
the,gas was transported and sold off the premises); Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406
(N.D. Tex. 1983) aff'd 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1984) (expenses of installing compressor
to move the gas to a gathering line for marketing were deductible where lessee was required
to pay one-eighth of the net proceeds at the well).
16. See generally Note, Meaning of Market Value, supra note 9, at 1050-51; Comment,
Value of Lessor's Share, supra note 9, at 652-54, and cases cited therein.
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that the "market price" is the actual price paid while the "market
value" is the hypothetical price that a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller for the product. 7 Such a distinction is of no consequence when
considered in terms of the deductibility of costs, since marketing-related
costs and severance taxes are deductible under both clauses.'8
Expenses Borne By The Operator Alone
The Louisiana Mineral Code specifies that in the absence of an
express contractual provision to the contrary the lessee-operator bears
all drilling and production costs. 9 As noted above, what constitutes a
production cost is to be determined by reference to the customs of the
industry and the jurisprudence. 0
It is well settled that expenses incurred in oil and gas exploration
are costs of production,2' as are the expenses incurred in bringing the
minerals to the surface. 22 Also considered costs of production are those
related to any activity customarily conducted by the producer at the
wellhead. Such costs are not chargeable against the royalty owner absent
some express provision in the lease agreement to the contrary. Among
such costs usually absorbed by the lessee-operator are those related to: 3
(1) Geological surveys,
(2) Drilling,
(3) Testing, completing, or reworking a well, 4
17. See generally Note, Meaning of Market Value, supra note 9, at 1050-51; Fischl,
supra note 9, at 29-32, and cases cited therein.
18. For market value clauses, see Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil
Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1868 (1985); Freeland v. Sun
Oil Co., 277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826 (1960); Sartor v. United
Gas Public Serv. Co., 186 La. 555, 173 So. 103 (1937); Crichton v. Standard Oil Co.
of La., 178 La. 57, 150 So. 668 (1933); State ex rel. Boykin v. Hope Producing Co.,
167 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936); Altman & Lindberg, Oil and Gas: Non-operating
Oil and Gas Interests' Liability for Post-Production Costs and Expenses, 25 Okla. L.
Rev. 363 (1972); Rogers, Royalties on Processed Gas, 14 Inst. Min. L. 29 (1967). For
market price clauses, see Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.
1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 656, 56 S. Ct. 381 (1936); Helmer v. Union Producing Co.,
40 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. La. 1941); Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 183 La. 287, 163 So.
103 (1935); Wall v. United Gas Public Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934);
Harrell, Recent Developments in the Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 33 Inst. Oil & Gas
L. & Tax'n 17 (1982).
19. See supra notes I & 2 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
21. 3 H. Williams, supra note 15, at § 645.1.
22. Id.
23. Id. See also § 645.3.
24. Id. This includes both tangible and intangible costs, as well as the cost of installing
the Christmas tree.
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(4) Secondary recovery, and
(5) Separators at or near the well.
Expenses Borne Proportionately By The Operator And The
Royalty Owner
It is generally accepted that the production phase of oil and gas
operations terminates upon reduction of the minerals to possession at
the well. While the peculiarities of individual lease provisions may provide
otherwise, the general rule is that a royalty owner is liable for a pro-
portionate share of the costs incurred subsequent to production.' 5 Such
"subsequent to production" costs generally include those related to taxes,
transportation, and processing. 26
Taxes
Other than the income tax, persons involved in the oil and gas
industry encounter taxation in the form of the severance tax and the
windfall profits tax. Lessee-operators are required by law to deduct
severance taxes from amounts due to royalty owners before making such
payments, whether the payment be in money or in kind. 7
The burden of the severance tax is placed proportionately on the
royalty owner and the lessee.2" The Louisiana Supreme Court established
this basic rule in Wright v. Imperial Oil & Gas Products Co.2 9 The
royalty clause of the lease in Wright indicated that the royalty on gas
was to be paid at a fixed price in money. The court held that the fact
25. Id. at § 645.2. This is particularly true where the royalty is payable "at the
well," although the courts have construed royalties to be payable "at the well" where
the lease was silent as to the place of measurement. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying
text.
26. See generally LaGrone, Calculating the Landowner's Royalty, 28 Rocky Mtn.
Min. L. Inst. 803 (1982); E. Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 42.2 (1967);
3 H. Williams, supra note 15 at § 645.2.
27. La. R.S. 47:636 (1970).
28. While the terms of La. R.S. 47:636 do not expressly state that the tax is to be
borne proportionately by the royalty owner and his lessee, the courts have consistently
held that such an allocation of the burden is correct. Furthermore, the terms of La. R.S.
47:636(B) (1970) provide the clear inference for such treatment:
In the event that any severer of natural resources who has paid the severance
taxes upon natural resources severed from the soil or water should receive any
rebate or refund thereof or with respect thereto from either the purchaser of
the natural resources or the collector, the severer shall distribute to the respective
royalty owners and owners of the natural resources at the time of the severance
their proportionate share of said rebates or refunds.
29. 177 La. 482, 148 So. 685 (1933). See also Cox v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 188 So.
2d 667 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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that the royalty was payable in money rather than in kind did not
impose upon the lessee the burden of the entire tax, but rather that
the royalty owner was liable for his proportionate share.
In Sartor v. Union Carbide Co.,3 ° the court considered the de-
ductibility of severance taxes from a royalty interest of one-eighth of
the value of gas calculated at the market price at the well. In holding
that the lessee properly deducted the royalty owner's proportionate share
of the severance taxes before paying the royalty, the court applied the
rationale of Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co., where the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated:
Previous to the moment the gas reached the surface of the
ground, the parties owned nothing so far as the gas was con-
cerned, except the right to explore for it and reduce it to
possession and ownership. But when the gas reached the surface
of the ground, the parties owned it in the proportion of one-
eighth to the lessor and seven-eighths to the lessee, and, if it
had been contemplated or provided in the lease contract that
the gas should be divided in kind, it would hardly be disputed
that the division should be made at the well."
The proportional allocation of the liability for the severance tax on
the owners of the oil and gas is responsive to the principal nature of
the tax. The severance tax is levied, not on those severing the natural
resources from the soil or water, but on the resources themselves. Hence,
the liability for the tax is assessed against the owners of the severed
resources in proportion to their ownership interests therein. 2 The courts
have, however, at least implicitly, recognized the right of the parties to
contractually place the burden of the tax on the lessee.3
30. 183 La. 287, 163 So. 103 (1935). See also Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor,
78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 656 (1936).
31. 178 La. at 913, 152 So. at 563.
32. 167 So. at 508.
33. Id. See generally LaGrone, supra note 26, at 805. See also Everett v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 218 La. 835, 51 So. 87 (1950). The lease in Everett provided for the
royalty payment of a bonus to be calculated as follows:
[Oine-eighth (1/8) of the lessee's seven-eighths (7/8) working interest oil first
produced and saved . . . if, as and when such oil shall be produced and saved,
free and clear of all costs and development or operation, until there shall have
been produced and saved to the credit of said fractional part of the oil the
market value of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) at the current market
price at the time of production . . ..
218 La. at 856, 51 So. 2d at 95. The court interpreted the language of that bonus clause
as specifying the payment in oil having a market value of $15,000.00 without any deduction
for the severance tax, as "oil having a market value of $15,000.00 means oil that can
be sold on the market for that price, obviously not oil upon which a severance tax is
due." 218 La. at 858, 51 So. 2d at 95.
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To be distinguished from the severance tax is the Crude Oil Windfall
Profits Tax.34 In Tenneco West, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a tax shifting
clause requiring the lessee to pay any and all taxes "upon or referable
to any operations or acts of the lessee" did not shift from the royalty
owner to the lessee the entire incidence of the windfall profits tax." In
reversing the decision of the district court, which had held that the
windfall profits tax was a severance tax, the court of appeals noted
that the tax was to be imposed on excess revenue resulting from decontrol
of crude oil prices and from increases in world oil prices.16 Deciding
that the tax is imposed on incremental revenue, the court held that
although the tax is triggered by removal and sale of the oil, the tax
was not "upon or referable to any operations or acts of the lessee,"
as phrased in the tax shifting clause of the lease.37 In support of its
position, the court further noted that no tax is due under the Act unless
the price realized on removal exceeds the statutory base price.38
It is submitted that neither the holding in Tenneco nor the Crude
Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act preclude the shifting of the tax. The
holding in Tenneco was premised on a strict construction of the language
contained in the royalty clause rather than on any general proscription
of the right to shift the burden of that particular tax. The court's
construction of the nature of the windfall profits tax and the application
of that construction to the terms of the Tenneco tax shifting clause
appears to be correct. The tax being imposed on incremental revenue
seems clearly to be at least one step removed from any tax that would
be imposed "upon or referable to any operations or acts of the lessee." 3
Furthermore, the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act contains no exprss
prohibition preventing the shifting of the tax.4 Therefore, it would seem
that a contractual provision explicitly shifting the burden of the windfall
profits tax would be effective. It is suggested that the holding in Tenneco
permits such an inference.
34. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-4998 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
35. 756 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1985). The tax shifting clause required Marathon to pay
taxes incidental to "the drilling or operation of any well or wells, the production, extraction,
severance, or removal of any oil, ... the processes, refining, storage or use thereof,
[and] the sale . . .or the transportation thereof away from the demised premises." 756
F.2d at 770-71.









In the absence of an express contractual provision to the contrary,
royalty owners usually bear a proportionate share of transportation
costs. 4 This is particularly true where the royalty clause specifies that
the royalty be based on a value determined at the wellhead and where
there is no market for the gas at that point.
42
The Supreme Court of Louisiana considered the question in Wall
v. United Gas Public Service Co., 43 where the royalty clause required
that the royalty for gas used or sold off the premises be based on one-
eighth of the value of such gas calculated at the market price. The
lessees transported the gas through private pipe lines a distance of
approximately two miles where it was sold to a pipe line company at
5.8 cents per thousand cubic feet. The lessees based the royalty com-
putation on a value of 4 cents per thousand cubic feet, which they
contended was the market price at the well. The royalty owner demanded
a settlement based on the 5.8 cents sale price. The contract was silent
as to the place at which market price was to be determined. The court,
in considering the issue, stated:
We think it reasonable to assume that the parties intended that,
if there was a market for gas in the field, the current market
price there should be paid. There is where the gas was reduced
to possession and there is where ownership of it sprang into
existence . . . [Wlhen the gas reached the surface of the ground,
the parties owned it in the proportion of one-eighth to the lessor
and seven-eighths to the lessee, and, if it had been contemplated
or provided in the lease contract that the gas should be divided
in kind, it would hardly be disputed that the division should
be made at the well."
Based on that analysis, the court went on to hold that as the market
price was being determined at the well, in the absence of any express
provision to the contrary, costs of transporting the product to market
were to be borne by both the lessee and the royalty owner. In so
holding, the court stated:
To hold that the lessors in this case should receive in settlement
one-eighth . . . of the gross price received by defendants for
the gas, would, in effect, be to hold that it was the duty of
the lessees to bear all the expense of carrying the gas to a market
41. 3 H. Williams, supra note 15, at § 645.2.
42. See LaGrone, supra note 26, at 819.
43. 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561.
44. Id. at 913, 152 So. at 563.
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beyond the gas field . . . [TIhe lessee cannot be taxed with the
whole cost of marketing the gas . . .45
Processing and Treatment
Oil and gas usually contain impurities which must be removed to
make the product marketable. The raw products also contain other
compounds and substances which through various processing and treat-
ment techniques create additional products. Both removal of impurities
and further processing or refining increase the value of the product
above that which it had in its natural state. 46 At issue is whether the
costs incurred in processing the product are deductible.
The general rule in Louisiana was summarized in 1960 by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Freeland v. Sun Oil
Co. 47 In Freeland, the lease specified that the royalty on "gas sold or
45. Id. at 917, 152 So. at 564. Although the transportation issue was resolved by
evidence establishing that a market in the field actually existed and that the royalty paid
was the same as the average price paid there, the principle that transportation costs are
deductible was clearly established in the case. The reference to the existing market price
in the field permits the inference that the general principle is qualified to the degree that
transportation costs are deductible only to the extent that they do not reduce the royalty
paid below the market price in the field, if one exists. This leads to the further inference
that in the absence of a determinable market price in the field, the courts may exercise
some discretion in establishing a check on the reasonableness of the deduction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated a succinct summation
of the principle in Freeland v. Sun Oil Co.
[l]n the analytical process of reconstructing a market value where none otherwise
exists with sufficient definiteness, all increases in the ultimate sales value at-
tributable to the expenses incurred in transporting and processing the commodity
must be deducted. The royalty owner shares only in what is left over, whether
stated in terms of cash or an end product. In this sense he bears his proportionate
part of that cost, but not because the obligation (or expense) of production
rests on him. Rather, it is because that is the way in which Louisiana law
arrives at the value of the gas at the moment it seeks to escape from the
wellhead.
Freeland, 277 F.2d at 159. See also Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 183 La. 287, 163 So.
103 (1935) (the court in dicta stated "The obvious reason why the market price at the
well or field where the gas is obtained cannot be said to cover the market price in the
parish where the gas is produced is because of the transportation charges which would
necessarily augment the market price in the parish above the market price at the well or
field." Id. at 289, 163 So. at 104; Sartor v. United Gas Public Service Co., 186 La.
555, 173 So. 103 (1937); Hemler v. Union Producing Co., 40 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. La.
1941), aff'd in part, and rev'd in part, 134 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1943); Piney Woods
Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1868 (1985); and Harrell, supra note 18, at 51.
46. See generally Rogers, supra note 18; LaGrone, supra note 26; Freeland, 277 F.2d
at 154 (discussions of various processing and treatment methods).
47. Freeland, 277 F.2d at 159.
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used off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products,"
would be based on the "market value at the well" of gas so sold or
used, while the royalty on "gas sold at the wells" would be based on
the amount actually received. 41 While the gas as produced had some
theoretical value, in fact, due to its wet nature, it had little marketability
and, therefore, had no demonstrated market value. The lessee entered
into a contract with an independent gasoline processing plant to extract
the recoverable liquids in order to maximize the value of the gas. The
terms of the contract specified that 35.7 percent of the end product
would be payable to the processing plant as the cost of extraction. The
royalty owners sued the lessee, demanding that their royalty be based
on 100 percent of the liquids extracted rather than the 64.3 percent
retained by the lessee after processing. In holding that the costs of
extraction were deductible, the court stated:
[T]he value of the raw, wet gas in its relatively unmarketable
state at the wellhead was not equivalent to the price which the
end product of that industrial process would command. The wet
gas was important. Indeed, it was the indispensable raw material.
But the availability of the extracting process and its application
enhanced the value of the gas. The enhancement is of the value
of the gas at the wellhead . . .In determining the market value
of such gas at the well where there is no established criteria of
a market, the Louisiana approach . . . is to consider the end
product of the extraction process as a factor. But it is a factor
in reconstructing a market value at a place where there was no,
or little, market and consequently an appropriate deduction must
be made. 49
The Freeland court went on to summarize the general principle
previously established by the Louisiana Supreme Court:"
[The principle] is not ... limited to the extraction cost necessary
to make an absolutely worthless thing (gas) into something of
value. It stands for the proposition that in determining market
value costs which are essential to make a commodity worth
anything or worth more must be borne proportionately by those
who benefit."
48. Id. at 157.
49. Id.
50. See Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940); Roy v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co., 200 La. 233, 7 So. 2d 895 (1942).
51. Freeland, 277 F.2d at 159. For other relevant federal court decisions, see O'Neal
v. Union Producing Co., 153 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1946), aff'g 57 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. La.
1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 715, 67 S. Ct. 46 (1946); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
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Although the authority of Freeland as an abstract proposition of
law is subject to qualification, the case having been decided by a federal
court, the rule stated therein nevertheless presents a concise summary
of Louisiana law on the issue of the deductibility of processing costs.
As observed by one author, the federal courts have consistently restricted
the payment of royalties on plant products extracted from gas to cases
where the terms of the lease expressly provide for such treatment.12 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana has, on the other hand, consistently rec-
ognized the right of royalty owners to receive royalties based on the
value of natural gasoline extracted from the wellhead product, although
one author has opined that the supreme court has not yet directly
addressed the issue in the context of a factual situation where a market
price for the gas at the well has been established." Even though some
uncertainty may remain as to the revenue side of the issue, it is submitted
that, the principle so clearly enunciated in Freeland represents a fair
assessment of Louisiana law on the deductibility of processing costs
from royalties due on products thus obtained.
Although neither the relevant cases in which the issue has been
considered nor the general rule established therein present a detailed
analysis of the specific costs that may be included, logic dictates that
the allowable deduction is of necessity a function of both direct and
indirect costs. At issue in determining the reasonableness of the deduction
should be the question of whether proper cost accounting techniques
have been followed.
Coffee, 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737, 64 S. Ct. 42 (1944);
Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1868 (1985). For related decisions by Louisiana courts, see Wemple
v. Producers' Oil Co., 145 La. 1031, 83 So. 232 (1919); Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel
Co., 175 La. 990, 144 So. 737 (1932); Crichton v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 178 La. 57,
150 So. 668 (1933); Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934);
Gibbs v. Southern Carbon Co., 171 So. 587 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937); Tyson v. Surf Oil
Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940). See also Rogers, supra note 18 for an analysis of
these cases; LaGrone, supra note 26 at 821.
52. See Rogers, supra note 18, at 40.
53. Id. However, one may argue that Rogers' analysis is inconsistent with the decision
by that court in Wall. The Supreme Court of Louisiana there stated:
[Tlhe lessee cannot be taxed with the whole cost of marketing the gas and
extracting therefrom the gasoline. That, in sum, was the ruling of the trial
judge in the present case .. .His ruling would unquestionably be correct if as
a matter of fact the gas had no "market value" in the field. But we find as
a fact that it did.
178 La. at 917-18, 152 So. at 564 (emphasis added). The royalty in Wall being based
on the market price, that case cannot be distinguished on the grounds that the decision
spoke of market value. These terms are used interchangeably. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
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Expenses Subject To Dispute
Compression
Costs of compression may be considered a specific form of trans-
portation costs, or at least their theoretical equivalent. The need for
the compression of gas arises as the pressure in a natural gas reservoir
declines due to the depletion of the reservoir. Compression is necessary
to force the gas into the main transmission pipe line once the reservoir
pressure and the pipe line pressure reach the point of equilibrium. This
requires the construction of compressors, at considerable cost, to boost
the pressure of the gas so that it will enter the pipe line.14
In light of Louisiana decisions which state that, in the absence of
contractual provisions to the contrary, the royalty is to be based on a
value to be determined at the wellhead, the costs of compression should
be deductible." The logic of such treatment is evident when the pro-
duction function is generally considered to end at the wellhead-the
point where the gas is reduced to possession and where ownership is
determined. 6 Nevertheless, there exists a divergence of opinion on the
subject among the various states. 7
In Martin v. Glass, 8 the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas held that compression charges were proportionately
chargeable against the royalty where the provisions of the lease called
for a royalty on gas of "one-eighth of the net proceeds at the well." 59
The lessee in Martin installed a compressor to boost the pressure of
the gas because there was not enough pressure at the wellhead for the
gas to flow into the gathering line, and the lessee deducted a pro-rata
share of that cost before paying royalties. In holding that such costs
were properly deducted, the court first found that the royalty was to
54. See Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 364; LaGrone, supra note 26, at 809.
55. See discussion regarding the interpretation of royalty clauses, supra notes 9-18
and authorities cited therein.
56. See Wall, 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934); Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18,
at 367. See also Siefkin, Rights of Lessor and Lessee with Respect to Sale of Gas and
as to Gas Royalty Provisions, 4 Inst. Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 181, 201 (1953) (cited by
Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 369) ("To my mind it is at least equally persuasive
to insist that the duty to market is confined to the product in the state in which it is
produced at the well, and does not include any duty, at the lessee's sole expense, to
increase its value by processing, any more than it includes a duty to transport it free of
charge to distant markets.") (emphasis original). It is submitted that the cost of compressing
the gas is a marketing cost and that there is no logical basis for distinguishing that cost
or its treatment from any other marketing cost.
57. See Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 366; LaGrone, supra note 26, at 809,
and cases cited therein.
58. 571 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 1410.
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be based on the value of the gas at the wellhead,60 and then considered
the nature of compression costs. Since, under Texas law, gas is produced
when it is severed from the land at the wellhead, the court decided that
production had been obtained from the wells, as there was sufficient
pressure to bring the gas to that point. 6' The court then noted that
compression is an element of the marketing function, as it is a "separate
and independent step, once or more removed from production. ' 62 There-
fore, the compression costs were held to be a post-production expense,
and as such were borne proportionately by the royalty owner and his
lessee. 63 In so deciding, the court borrowed heavily from the decision
of the fifth circuit in Freeland,64 noting that "while Freeland involved
the application of Louisiana law, it appears that Texas and Louisiana
law are the same: both jurisdictions allow the deduction of post-pro-
duction cost when royalty is determined 'at the mouth of the well."' 65
Furthermore, the Martin court referred to Louisiana law. 66
It is suggested that the decision in Martin is an accurate reflection
of Louisiana law and that the outcome would have been identical had
the issue arisen in a Louisiana court. One must bear in mind, however,
that while that general rule is relevant under the majority of leases in
force, the royalty due is always a function of the terms of each individual
lease. However, absent any express contractual provision to the contrary,
royalties based on market price, market value, or proceeds should bear
a proportionate share of compression costs.
60. Id. at 1411-12. The Martin court interpreted the royalty clause as follows:
[Rloyalty is based on the value of all gas produced at the mouth of the well.
Costs incurred prior to production are to be borne by the operator, while costs
incurred subsequent to production (those necessary to render the gas marketable)
are to be borne on a pro rata basis between operating and nonoperating interests.
61. Id. at 1415.
62. Id. at 1416. As authority for that statement, the court referred to 43 Tex. Jur.
2d Oil & Gas § 398, at 47 from which they quoted:
The lessee's obligation to market is to market at the wells, and thus in computing
the market value of the gas at the well for royalty purposes the lessee is entitled
to reimbursement for the lessor's proportionate part of the reasonable cost of
transporting the gas to the market, dehydrating, compressing, or otherwise
making the gas suitable for marketing, including extraction costs resulting from
processing.
571 F. Supp. at 1416 n.2 (emphasis added by the court).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1414; 277 F.2d 154, 159 (5th Cir. 1960).
65. 571 F. Supp. at 1414.
66. The Martin court referred to Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S.
620, 64 S. Ct. 724 rehearing denied, 322 U.S. 767 (1944); Wall v. United Gas Public
Service Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934); and Sartor v. United Gas Public Service
Co., 186 La. 555, 173 So. 103 (1937). These cases were cited for the proposition that
the lessor must bear a proportionate share of post-production costs.
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Dehydration
The wellhead product of oil and gas usually contains some water
which must be removed to make the product marketable. The quantity
of water contained in the product has a direct effect on the difficulty
of removal and the attendant costs. 67
The water will generally separate from the wellhead product of oil
through a settling process. However, the oil produced from some res-
ervoirs contains water in an emulsified condition. Such oil must be
subjected to chemical or heat treatment in order to remove the water.
Following removal, the water must be disposed of in some fashion
acceptable from an environmental perspective. This usually entails trans-
porting the water by either truck or pipe line to salt water disposal
wells where it is reinjected into underground reservoirs.6
The water contained in the wellhead product of natural gas must
also be removed, although the quantity of water involved is generally
much less than that contained in oil. Most pipe line companies will not
purchase gas that contains more -than seven pounds of water per million
cubic feet of natural gas. Mechanical separators, glycol units, and other
devices are used to separate the water from the natural gas.69
There appears to be no logical distinction between the costs of
dehydration and compression, processing, or transportation that would
call for any difference in the treatment of those costs in terms of who
should bear them. Such reasoning seems particularly appropriate when
viewed in terms of the holding in Wall that production terminates at
the wellhead. Altman and Lindberg reasoned thus:
If anything, it appears to be more logical to require the lessee
to bear the entire cost of transporting the product to market
than to cast the entire cost of compression, dehydration or
processing upon the lessee. Transportation of production to a
distant market at least contemplates movement of the product
in its original state or condition as produced from the well
without enhancing its intrinsic value. On the other hand, the
product as produced at the wellhead in its natural state is
transformed into a more valuable product(s) when it is com-
pressed, dehydrated or processed .... The great weight of au-
thority requires the sharing of transportation costs which are,
we submit, marketing costs as are compression, dehydration and
processing costs. A priori, all are post-production costs, that is,
costs incurred after the production function has been consum-
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mated. It follows, therefore, they should all be treated similarly
by apportionment of the costs thereof.7"
The fifth circuit considered the issue of the deductibility of dehy-
dration costs in the Texas case of Holbein v. Austral Oil Co.7 The
lease in Holbein called for royalties of one-eighth of the amount realized
from the sale of the gas. The court held that the dehydration costs
were costs incurred subsequent to production and should therefore be
allocated proportionately among the lessee and his royalty owners.1
2
Although no Louisiana cases on the issue have been located, it is
submitted that in light of the firmly established Louisiana rule that
production terminates at the wellhead, a fact pattern identical to that
in Holbein would be decided the same way by a court in Louisiana.
While, as noted above, the terms of each individual lease are deter-
minative of the outcome, absent any express agreement to the contrary,
royalties based on market value, market price, or proceeds should be
subject to a proportionate share of dehydration costs.
Problems Of Construction
Aside from the problem of ascertaining whether a royalty provision
based on "proceeds" means "gross" or "net" proceeds, as discussed
earlier, a problem of construction exists with regard to royalty interests
payable at a point other than "at the well." While lease provisions
specifying that royalty be based on either "proceeds," "market value,"
or "market price," without qualification as to where the measurement
is to be determined, are generally treated as measurable "at the well," 73
some leases expressly stipulate that the royalty be payable "in the pipe
line" or at "other delivery points."7 4
70. Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 378-79.
71. 609 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1980).
72. California has likewise held that costs of dehydration are properly deductible
where the royalty provisions of the lease specify that the royalty is to be determined "at
the well" or based on the "market price." See Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 3
Cal. 2d 396, 44 P.2d 573 (1935); and Bedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co.,
50 Cal. App. 2d 102, 122 P.2d 600 (4th Dist. 1942). However, there exists a split of
authority among other jurisdictions which appears to be based on the terms of the specific
royalty provisions in question rather than upon any theoretical basis for treatment of
dehydration costs as part of the production function. The lease in Clark v. Slick Oil Co.,
88 Okla. 55, 211 P. 496, 497 (1922) specified that the oil was to be delivered "free of
cost, in the pipe line," and the lessee there was charged with the entire burden of
dehydration costs. So too was the lessee in the Texas case of Reynolds v. McMan Oil
& Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928), where the royalty clause
called for a royalty of one-eighth of oil "produced and saved," and for the oil to be
delivered "free of cost in the tanks or pipe lines."
73. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
74. See 3 H. Williams, supra note 15, §§ 646, 646.2.
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The weight of authority indicates that royalty owners under leases
providing for royalties payable "free of cost in the pipe line" are subject
to a proportionate share of the expenses of transporting, compressing,
dehydrating, and processing the wellhead product to make it deliverable
to the pipe line. This treatment is based on the inference that the parties
under such a lease assumed that a pipe line connection would be available
at the well. The lessee's duty to market the product is not generally
,seen to encompass the burden of bearing the entire expense of preparing
the product for market.7"
However, a different result has been achieved where the lease calls
for "delivery free of cost at the pipe line or other delivery point." 7 6
Such a lease provision has been construed as imposing upon the lessee
the entire burden of transporting the product to market."
Conclusion
The royalty owner's share of production is always a function of
the royalty provisions contained in the oil or gas lease. While in theory
the royalty due 'is determined by reference to the intent of the parties
as expressed in the lease contract, the terms of that document often do
not clearly define which costs are to be borne by the lessee alone and
which are to be shared by the lessee and the royalty owner. As a
practical matter, the issue has been resolved by the courts through an
analysis of the lease provisions and the definition of royalty in the
Louisiana Mineral Code. Based on that definition, and absent any express
provisions in the lease to the contrary, the courts have construed royalties
to be measured and payable "at the well." As a consequence of that
determination, all costs of production are borne by the lessee alone,
while costs incurred subsequent to production are borne proportionately
by the lessee and the royalty owner. However, where the terms of
individual leases expressly dictate how specified costs will be allocated,
those lease provisions necessarily control.
The costs of severance taxes, transportation, processing, and treat-
ment are considered to be post-production costs and are, therefore,
borne proportionately by the lessee and the royalty owner. While some
question exists as to the proper treatment of the costs of compression
75. Id. at §§ 646.2, 612.1. See Kretni Dev. Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497
(10th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 750 (1935); Lafitte Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co.,
177 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1960); Molter v. Lewis,
156 Kan. 544, 134 P.2d 404 (1943); Reed v. Hackworth, 287 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App.
1956); Cameron v. Stephenson, 379 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1967). But see Hamilton v. Empire
Gas & Fuel Co., 117 Kan. 25, 230 P. 91 (1924); Clark v. Slick Oil Co., 88 Okla. 55,
211 P. 496 (1922).
76. 3 H. Williams, supra note 15, §§ 646.2, 612.2.
77. Id.
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and dehydration, it is submitted that there can be no logical basis for
distinguishing these costs from any other cost incurred subsequent to
production. This seems particularly self-evident in light of the Louisiana
concept that production ends at the well. The allocation of the burden
of those costs remains subject to dispute, however.
While the deductibility of any cost may be determined with reference
to its nature, the question iemains as to the reasonableness of the
particular item deducted. It is submitted that the deductibility question
should focus primarily on the propriety of the deduction in light of
acceptable cost accounting standards. Once the theoretical construct has
been established that costs in certain categories are deductible, the prin-
ciple follows that all relevant costs should be included. Among such
relevant costs are those of depreciation, overhead, and interest.
In addition to the character or nature of the costs deducted is the
question of the reasonableness of the amount deducted. The relevance
of this question can be seen in terms of the lessee's duty to act as a
reasonably prudent operator to the benefit of the royalty owner and
himself. When considering the reasonableness of the amount deducted,
it is submitted that one should first consider the reasonableness of the
cost incurred, and then assess the reasonableness of the amount allocated
to the lessor in terms of acceptable cost accounting standards.
Frederick R. Parker, Jr.
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